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When I was contacted by the editors of the Journal of Resistance Studies regarding a possible 
contribution to a series describing seminal books in the field of resistance studies, my thoughts quickly 
gravitated to Kenneth Boulding’s (1989) book on the Three Faces of Power. This may at first seem a 
surprising choice for this journal. It would definitely be a stretch to say that Boulding’s book has had a 
large influence on how actual resistance movements operate. The book has not seen anything approaching 
the attention to other more prominent contributions such as Gene Sharp’s (1973) The Politics of Non-
violent Action, which has been disseminated and popularized in a number of subsequent training manuals 
published in different languages, and arguably influenced popular movement such as the Arab Spring.  
Moreover, although Boulding’s 1989 book has received positive reviews and some attention in academic 
circles, it can hardly be deemed a classic or a game-changer, and indeed, other books by Boulding have 
received more attention and greater prominence. For example, although citations are not a perfect 
measure of influence, the Three Faces of Power has about 800 citations in Google Scholar as of July 
2017, while Boulding’s 1962 book Conflict and Defense: A General Theory has over 2500 citations.  
Other books published in the same time period have received more citations; there are for example over 
1300 citations Todd Sandler’s (1992) much more technical volume, reviewing and discussing formal 
models of collective action and what has been learned since Olson’s (1958) original work. However, I 
will argue that the Three Faces of Power deserves a wide readership as it provides a very useful analysis 
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of the concept of power, very prescient at the time that it was written, and with enduring relevance and 
much to offer people interested in resistance and dissent.  
 
I will start with a brief overview of the book and its core thesis. Boulding’s main purpose in the book is to 
understand the role of power in social systems. He notes that the common definition of power as the 
ability “to get what we want” is very encompassing, and hides many subtleties. For example, what we 
want depends on our preferences, and this in turn begs the question of what shapes our preferences and 
views on particular outcomes. Many types of possible behavior and actions are not limited by any obvious 
technical feasibility or what we could do in principle, but rather constrained by social norms and other 
non-material inhibitions. Finally, most decisions and outcomes ultimately result from complex 
interactions between individuals and collective actors such as organizations rather than individual 
preferences or decisions alone. There is a common tendency to associate power with specific sources of 
power, such as coercive military capabilities (as in Mao’s famous quote that “power comes from the 
barrel of a gun”). At the same time, it is also widely acknowledged that many actors such as the Pope can 
be influential and powerful, even if Stalin is rumored to have insisted to the French foreign minister that 
the Pope could not be influential as he did not possess any military units (for a more contemporary 
analysis of the influence of the Vatican, see Genovese 2015).  
 
As the title suggests, Boulding proposes that our understanding of power can be advanced by 
distinguishing between distinct types of power. Boulding’s terminology at this point becomes somewhat 
less clean and three-partite than the book title suggests, as he distinguishes between both the 
consequences of power and characteristics of behavior. In terms of the former, he distinguishes between 
destructive, productive, and integrative power. Destructive power basically encompasses the ability to 
remove valued things, such as traditional military threats. By contrast, productive power means the ability 
to produce, or to create valued things such as improved technology and welfare. Finally, integrative 
power can be thought of as the ability to foster solidarity, which in turns influences the ability for 
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collective action. This typology maps – if not perfectly – onto three types of characteristic behavior, 
namely threat power, exchange power, and love. Threat power is the ability to get people to do things 
based on threat, while exchange power can be thought of as creating contracts or agreements whereby one 
actor does something in exchange for something else, while “the power of love” is the ability to get 
people to do something through identification, respect or legitimacy. Although the terminology shifts over 
time and the categories are not fully unique, the core distinction between destructive, productive, and 
integrative power is at least conceptually clear and analytically very helpful.  
 
In an interesting and perceptive review of Sharp’s 1973 book and the associated “consent theory of 
power”, Boulding (1974) argued that Sharp placed far too much emphasis on threat power, and not 
enough on integrative power and the dynamics of legitimacy. One of Boulding’s core points in Three 
Faces of Power is that each type of power is normally not sufficient on its own, and that integrative 
capacity is often more important than threat power. For example, military power alone is unlikely to be 
effective if integrative capacity approaches nill, yet actors with sufficiently strong integrative power can 
be influential, even without notable military power. Armies are built on threat power, but is the ability to 
make people collaborate or fight as teams that ultimately make armies effective (see, e.g., Stouffer 1949; 
Turchin 2006) In a memorable section, Boulding notes how the extraordinary integrative power had 
helped the Jews survive as a group under extreme circumstances with low military power, while Israel’s 
growing military power and responses to external threats have arguable decreased community and 
integrative power (pp. 50-51). Boulding’s claim that the impact of war had been overestimated by 
historians must have seemed preposterous to many during the height of Cold War, when most of the 
material in this book was written, but astonishingly prescient after its first publication in 1989. The end of 
the Cold War emerged as a transformative event arguably as important as World War II, yet not clearly 
reducible to any clear changes in military power or threat capacity.  
 
4 
 
My own thinking about power and my core research interests have very much been shaped by this book, 
but not in a simple or linear fashion. I believe I first read the Three Faces of Power when I started my 
PhD in the Fall of 1995. I must confess that I at the time probably picked up a copy of the book in a 
second hand book store mainly since I was a PhD student affiliated with the Program on Political and 
Economic Change at the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado, which originally 
had been led by Boulding himself. Yet, I think I came to the book at the right time, both in terms of the 
salient events that the book helped me make sense of, and my own subsequent research interests and 
focuses. 
 
Like most people, my own understanding of power started from the traditional view that power is defined 
primarily by resources and that more thus is always mightier. Indeed, I can recall having rather 
conventional and conspiratorial views about social issues, with a tendency to assume that “powerful” 
actors inevitably dominate the world, and that bad outcomes must reflect their entrenched interests and 
overwhelming resources. But this was difficult to reconcile with my knowledge that non-violent 
resistance often had been much more effective than violent resistance against dictatorships. This was 
informed by both older historical examples – such as the Norwegian non-violent resistance during World 
War II (see Gleditsch 1997) – and also seemed to be confirmed by the role of popular mobilization 
leading up to the end of Socialist dictatorships in Eastern Europe that I had seen unfold around me while 
growing up in the late 1980s. 
 
Reading literature on non-violence such as Sharp (1973) and Martin (1991) helped me realize that power 
ultimately rests on some kind of compliance, and that leaders and autocratic regimes could collapse when 
this was successfully withdrawn. However, these were less helpful when it came to understanding what 
influenced collective responses and the ability to motivate or prevent people from acting. 
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After starting to study Political Science in 1992 I came to understand the broader implications of 
collective action problems, beyond the standard examples such as underprovision of public goods or the 
tragedy of the commons. In brief, shared interest is not enough to foster collaboration or common action, 
especially if individual action is costly (e.g., Olson 1958; Sandler 1992). This helped me understand 
barriers to collective action and why achieving political protest and change is difficult, even when 
dissatisfaction is widespread. More generally, I also came to appreciate how many “bad” outcomes and 
social dilemmas may not actually clearly benefit anyone very much in particular, but it is simply not in 
any single individual’s interest to change her or his behavior under the status quo, and difficult to get 
coordinated collective responses that allow people to reach feasible outcomes that are better for all.  
 
In short, I learned much that was helpful for understanding the barriers to collective action, and why this 
is difficult, but not so much about positive influences that could enable collective action, especially when 
conventional threat power defined by military coercion is low. This is where Boulding is helpful in 
suggesting exchange power and integrative power as possible components that can make actors 
potentially powerful. It is easy to see the relevance of potential integrative power in terms of in-group 
solidarity and out-group distinctions. Shared identities and symbols that create solidarity and capacity for 
collective action, such as ethnicity and nationalism, can clearly help create effective movements. These 
ideas informed much of my subsequent thinking about mobilization in ethnic civil wars (see in particular 
Cederman et al. 2013), and they are also helpful for understanding many of the nationalist movements 
that brought down Socialism in Eastern Europe, even if we may regret the exclusionary nature of many 
nationalist movements.  
 
However, the role of exchange power is also helpful for understanding prospects for political change, and 
these ideas in turn shaped my work on democratization and the diffusion of transitions, including 
Gleditsch (2002) and Gleditsch and Ward (2006). In principle, non-material common ideas such as 
democracy and political freedom could help provide a common platform, but motivation is often not 
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enough, and some observers cast doubt on how widely-held such ideals actually are among participants in 
anti-regime uprisings (see, e.g., Beisinger 2013 for discussion of evidence from Ukraine). However, the 
concept of mutual gains from exchange provides a helpful way to think about how rules for political 
competition can serve as a rational compromise and response to conflict between heterogeneous and 
diverse actors (e.g., Olson 1993; Vanhanen 1990). Consent and legitimacy often arise not because of the 
specific content of a decision or the outcome, but because people accept the process leading up to it as 
fair, and the loser has a fair chance to win on another occasion (e.g., Anderson et al. 2007). Beyond 
process, material incentives matter in the sense that bystanders and individuals on the side of opponents 
can be won over if you can offer them tangible benefits or the promise of making them better off. In this 
sense, the revolutions in Eastern Europe happened to a large extent because opportunistic elites defected 
as they came to believe that socialist rule was unviable, and many of the same individuals that had held 
power before later returned to political influence.  
 
The strengths of the conceptual focus of the Three Faces of Power and its ambitious scope is perhaps also 
its greatest limitation. The book is full of examples, but all of these are rather selectively chosen, and 
there is little attention paid to systematic empirical analysis or how the different sources of power may be 
measured empirically. This, in turn, limits the direct applicability of concepts and insights from the 
analysis. Although the book starts in the social sciences, and probably should remain there, Boulding is 
unable to resist the temptation to extend his perceptive eye to look for analogies between the three types 
of power and evolution in the natural sciences. This discussion is entertaining and insightful, but does not 
help advance the coherence of the book. 
 
However, my rereading of the book for this essay helped bring out new sides of the analysis and 
rediscover the richness of the analysis. Boulding’s book also has much to offer current students and 
practitioners in resistance, in particular with regards to recognizing the diverse sources of power in many 
strategic settings and the complementarity between the faces of power. Boycotting companies with 
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practices that we do not like might make us feel good, but we can be more effective enacting change if we 
use exchange power productively to innovate, enlist, and reward alternative practices, and make these 
profitable. Accentuating our disdain for “baskets of deplorables” may help us achieve a greater sense of 
community, but focusing on highlighting differences alone is unlikely to win over opponents. Three 
Faces of Power may not present all the answers, but it certainly does help to pose several very good 
questions.  
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